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his paper proposes a bright line test to guide the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (‘‘CRTC’’) in regulating ‘‘network neutrality’’. When Internet service providers seek to discriminate between uses and users in administering their networks, the CRTC should ask whether the proposed
discrimination is a reasonable effort to make the price paid by each user commensurate to the demands which his
or her use places on the network. Discrimination which meets this description should be tolerated if not actively
encouraged, because it encourages the economically efficient allocation of scarce bandwidth. All other forms of
ISP discrimination — including discrimination based on aesthetic judgments and profit-seeking discrimination in
favour of owned or affiliated content — should be restrained by the CRTC, relying on subsection 27(2) of the
Telecommunications Act. Strong moral and economic arguments support the imposition of this limited neutrality
regime, and only a few minor reforms would be required to put it into place.

Introduction

vice experienced by a user proportional to the demands
that he or she places on the network is justifiable,
whereas most other forms of discrimination are unjustifiable. I argue that restricting ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination is both ethically and economically justified by the
public interest in network neutrality. The fourth and
final Part of this paper will briefly describe the policy
changes which would be necessary to put this bright line
test into effect. Subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act, properly interpreted by the CRTC, can do
most of the heavy lifting. However, a minor amendment
to the Telecommunications Act and a public education
campaign would also be advantageous.

S

hould the right of Internet service providers (‘‘ISPs’’)
to discriminate between users and uses in administrating their networks be constrained by regulation? 1
Those who answer in the affirmative appeal for ‘‘network
neutrality’’; their opponents lack an alliterative slogan,
but have nonetheless managed to resist neutrality-oriented regulatory proposals so far. In the United States,
the network neutrality controversy has generated more
heat than light, but north of the border, it has scarcely
generated either heat or light. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (‘‘CRTC’’)
and the Telecommunications Policy Review (‘‘TPR’’)
have taken a cautious, diffident approach to the issue, no
cabinet minister has taken a stance, 2 and little scholarly
attention has been paid to the matter.
This essay will suggest a normative framework for
the neutrality-oriented regulation of ISP behaviour in
Canada. It will begin in Part I by surveying the actual
and potential behaviour of Canadian ISPs to which network neutrality advocates object. Part II will identify the
efforts of scholars, legislators, and the CRTC to draw a
line between justifiable and unjustifiable ISP discrimination. Part III will propose a bright line test which could
be used to distinguish the ISP behaviour which should
be constrained from that which should not. In short,
discrimination that makes the price and quality of ser-

I. Network Discrimination: Current
Practices

N

etwork neutrality’s various proponents have little
in common, but they are all concerned about network discrimination. Professor Ed Felten defines network discrimination with regard to the way servers treat
packets which are seeking to be routed through them. 3
Under a ‘‘minimal discrimination’’ policy, servers only
discard or delay packets when it is absolutely necessary
to do so because there are too many waiting in the
queue. All other forms of discrimination (for example,
giving priority to some packets even when the server is
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not overloaded) are defined by Felten as ‘‘non-minimal’’.
Minimal discrimination, as defined by Felten, is often
inevitable, and not a subject of controversy. 4
Many other forms of ISP discrimination are also
uncontroversial. Most ISPs screen data for spam and
viruses, and although this is ‘‘non-minimal discrimination’’ (insofar as packets containing viruses will be discarded regardless of server congestion), it does not provoke protests from users. Many Canadian ISPs offer
various speed tiers of broadband Internet service, and
this can be understood as a form of discrimination
between users. Rogers executive Bill Linton recently
speculated that the number of speed tiers offered by his
company will grow substantially in the near future. 5 Network neutrality proponents do not generally protest the
use of speed tiers.
It is more aggressive forms of discrimination that
have fuelled the controversy. Professor Tim Wu surveyed
discriminatory practices by American cable and DSL
Internet providers in 2002, 6 and divided them into two
categories. ‘‘Contractual’’ discrimination is imposed via
terms in usage agreements. Such discrimination usually
forbids users to operate home networks or servers, to use
the connection for commercial purposes, or to exceed a
certain bandwidth limit. 7 ‘‘Architectural’’ discrimination,
imposed via network administration, primarily consists
of ‘‘asymmetry’’ — making more bandwidth available for
downloading than for uploading.
Discrimination that is ‘‘non-minimal’’ and ‘‘architectural’’ has become much more pervasive and technologically sophisticated since Wu wrote in 2002. For example,
recently published promotional material for trafficshaping software promises that:
[u]sing eight different levels of traffic shaping, the . . . policy
settings allow organizations to prioritize network traffic for
any IP-based application, including those sensitive to latency
and jitter such as Voice-over-IP (‘‘VoIP’’), video or real-time
conferencing applications. Data from business-critical applications or from specific groups of users can take precedence. 8

How have these new technologies been used by
ISPs, and which uses are most objectionable to the network neutrality advocates? In Canada, three incidents of
data discrimination have generated the lion’s share of
controversy.
●
Rogers acknowledged in late 2005 that it practices ‘‘traffic shaping’’, a form of discrimination,
to restrain the bandwidth consumed by peer-topeer file sharing programs such as BitTorrent. 9
●
Shaw Communications currently offers its
broadband customers a $10 per month ‘‘quality
of service (QoS) enhancement . . . [to] improve
the quality of Internet telephony services offered
by third party providers’’. 10 Shaw also offers its
own VoIP service, for which no QoS enhancement is necessary. Some have suggested that the
QoS enhancement is designed to herd customers from the VoIP service of third parties

toward Shaw’s own VoIP service. Vonage
Canada (a VoIP provider) filed a complaint with
the CRTC and issued a press release denouncing
the QoS enhancement option as an ‘‘anti-competitive measure aimed at either increasing the
perceived cost, or damaging the perceived reliability, of the services of independent Internet
telephone service providers when compared to
Shaw’s higher-priced phone service’’. 11
●
In July 2005, Telus blocked access to ‘‘Voices for
Change’’, a Web site which supported Telus
employees on strike at the time. The site posted
images of picket line-crossers, and Telus cited
privacy and security concerns in blocking it. 12
The blockade persisted for approximately
16 hours, and collaterally affected at least 600
other sites due to Telus’s technical inability to
blockade only Voices for Change. 13 At least one
other Canadian ISP has targeted a user due to
the content of the user’s Web site. Host
OnFiber.com, an Alberta ISP, terminated its
hosting arrangement with slad.net, a site dedicated to vampirism. HostOnFiber CEO Andrew
Snood said that, in terminating the arrangement,
he was acting pursuant to a ‘‘personal, moral
stance, based on my own convictions’’. 14
Network neutrality advocates see these practices as
both objectionable in of themselves and as the thin edge
of a wedge. They sometimes invoke a ‘‘walled gardens’’
nightmare scenario. In this apocalyptic vision, ISPs will
restrict their users to content controlled by or affiliated
with the ISP or charge extortionate rates to users who
wish to ‘‘climb the walls’’ of the garden to access the rest
of the Internet. 15 This would be a throw-back to the era
of service providers like CompuServe and America
Online, whose users were largely confined to ‘‘walled
gardens’’.
There is no evidence of any such behaviour by
Canadian ISPs. However, modern technology is certainly
capable of imposing such a system. The fact that major
Canadian ISPs such as Bell and Rogers are corporate
siblings of media content-providers may make it more
tempting for the ISPs to discriminate in favour of content provided by affiliates, in order to keep the profits
within the corporate family.

II. Justifiable v. Unjustifiable
Discrimination: Attempts to
Draw the Line

N

etwork neutrality proponents differ widely both in
their diagnoses of objectionable ISP discrimination, and in their policy prescriptions to address the
issue. Canada’s TPR argued that ‘‘blocking access to
applications and content and significant, deliberate degradation of service’’ should be restrained by the CRTC. 16
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The TPR would give the regulator substantial discretion
over the issue, while instructing it to ‘‘rel[y] on market
forces and customer choice as much as possible’’. 17
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Michael Powell, former head of the United States
Federal Communications Commission (‘‘F.C.C.’’), has
asked ISPs to respect the right of consumers to (i) ‘‘access
the lawful Internet content of their choice’’; (ii) ‘‘run
applications and use services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement’’; (iii) ‘‘connect their choice
of legal devices that do not harm the network’’; and (iv)
have ‘‘competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers’’. The
intellectual lineage of these ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ can be
traced to the 1956 American Hush-a-Phone decision. In
that judgment, the D.C. Court of Appeals enshrined a
user’s ‘‘right reasonably to use his telephone in ways
which are privately beneficial without being publicly
detrimental’’. 18 The Four Freedoms were a non-binding
statement of principles, and Powell has made it clear that
he does not endorse their legislation or enforcement.
These are relatively modest network neutrality proposals. Neither the TPR nor Powell would seem to
object to Rogers’s traffic-shaping policy or Shaw’s VoIP
QoS premium. However, Telus’s blockade of Voices for
Change would probably fall on the wrong side of these
versions of network neutrality regulation.
Others have proposed much more aggressive regulatory intervention. Professor Geist’s submission to the
TPR argued that ‘‘content neutrality in the provision of
network services is an absolutely essential principle that
should be firmly established under Canadian law backed
by regulatory oversight and significant penalties for compliance failures’’. 19 Videotron CEO Robert Despatie also
calls for a big gun, albeit pointed in the opposite direction. He suggested that the federal government impose a
tariff on high-bandwidth content providers. ‘‘If the movie
studio were to mail a DVD . . . they would expect to pay
postage or courier fees’’, he noted in a November 2006
speech. ‘‘Why should they not expect a transmission
tariff?’’ 20 Despatie’s position is that the government
should not only tolerate content discrimination, it
should actively enforce it through the tax system.
In the United States Congress, at least four Bills
have been introduced to restrain the behaviour of network administrators in the name of network neutrality. 21
Representative Edward Markey’s proposed Network
Neutrality Act, 22 for example, would have not only forbade broadband network providers to ‘‘block, impair,
degrade, discriminate against, or interfere with the ability
of any person to utilize their broadband service’’, 23 but
would have also required them to ‘‘offer a service such
that . . . [other parties] can offer unaffiliated content,
applications, or services in a manner that is at least equal
to the speed and quality of service that the operator’s
content, applications, or service is accessed and
offered’’. 24 It is not entirely clear which forms of network
discrimination would have fallen on the wrong side of
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Markey’s line in the sand, but the practices of Rogers and
Shaw described above could certainly come under scrutiny. Markey’s Bill did not pass in 2006, but the issue
remains on the agenda in Washington.
Academics have also sought to draw bright lines
between justifiable and unjustifiable network discrimination. In a 2005 article, Professor Tim Wu seeks to
‘‘distinguish between classes of restrictions that should
generally be allowable, and those that might raise suspicion ’’. 25 Discriminating against viruses is clearly
unproblematic, whereas a network decision to ban lowbandwidth ‘‘chat’’ programs on the grounds that they are
‘‘just a waste of time’’ would clearly be illegitimate. 26
Between these two extremes, Wu identifies the possibility that ISPs will seek to charge certain users more, not
because they impose higher costs on the ISP, but rather
because the ISPs believe they can be made to pay more.
Wu argues that while this type of price discrimination is
not generally anti-competitive, it has a deleterious
‘‘dynamic’’ consequence on the Internet. It impedes the
innovation of new applications by tilting a playing field
which should be level. 27
To Professor Wu, ISPs’ attempt to ‘‘manage how
users consume bandwidth by discriminating against
types of usage’’ is a ‘‘laudable goal’’ 28 which complements network neutrality because it allows new applications such as VoIP to have the quality of service they
need in order to thrive. However, he argues that it is
better to pursue this goal through ‘‘technological solutions’’ or selling categories of service, rather than forbidding certain applications. 29 Wu’s general conclusion is
that network operators should generally be allowed to
‘‘police what they own’’ (i.e., their local network), but that
it might be legitimate to forbid certain types of discrimination against Internet applications. 30
These ideas were further developed in a submission
to the F.C.C. by Professor Wu and Lawrence Lessig. 31
The authors emphasize that a discriminatory network
not only tilts the playing field between today’s applications, but also introduces uncertainty among future
application developers about what forms of discrimination might one day be imposed. Wu and Lessig draw an
analogy between the Internet and the electricity system,
which works with a common set of standards across
North America and works equally well for anything one
might choose to connect to it. 32 They point to the beneficial effects of this system for innovation in the electronics industry, and argue that the Internet should have
the same neutrality.

The CRTC and Network Discrimination
The CTRC is responsible for regulating Canadian
ISPs pursuant to the Telecommunications Act. Subsection 27(2) of the Act states that
no Canadian carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a
telecommunications service or the charging of a rate for it,
unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable
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preference toward any person, including itself, or subject
any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage. 33

The CRTC deals with alleged contraventions of
subsection 27(2) in two steps. First, the Commission
determines whether discrimination or preference has
occurred. If so, it then asks whether or not the discrimination or preference was unjust, undue, or unreasonable. 34 In two recent cases, the CRTC was asked to apply
subsection 27(2) to network neutrality issues. These decisions suggest a tentative, ‘‘wait-and-see’’ approach to network neutrality on the part of the Commission.
The first decision involved Cybersurf, an ISP which
resells access to the Shaw network. The CRTC had previously ordered Shaw to provide this access to Cybersurf.
In November of 2005, Cybersurf asked the CRTC to
require Shaw to give it access to the $10/month QoS
enhancement and to ‘‘PacketCable’’ technology, which
major cable companies employed for their own customers but did not make available to Cybersurf. In September 2006, the CRTC denied the application. With
regard to the QoS Enhancement (‘‘QSE’’), the Commission found ‘‘no evidence that Shaw’s QSE gives its traffic
preference over Cybersurf’s or any other competitor’s
traffic’’. 35 While PacketCable could potentially give an
advantage to the major cable companies over Cybersurf,
the CRTC found that requiring the technology to be
shared could allow Cybersurf to monopolize the cable
companies’ bandwidth. 36
The second relevant CRTC ruling was Telecom
Decision 2005-28 (‘‘VoIP decision’’). 37 Yak Communications, which was in the business of selling VoIP services
using Canadian broadband networks, was among the
parties participating. Yak argued that the CRTC should
make an order forbidding broadband service providers
to
(i) establish contractual terms with their customers restraining their access to third-party
VoIP providers;
(ii) purposefully impair the service quality of
third-party VoIP providers; or
(iii) fail to offer third party VoIP customers the
same service quality experienced by their
other customers. 38
The CRTC declined to impose any of these conditions on the broadband providers. 39 The decision noted
the submission of the broadband providers that it was
not their practice to establish terms of the type described
by condition (i). Nor was evidence found of intentional
service degradation or discrimination. The Commission
also suggested that requiring ISPs to provide third party
VoIP businesses with access to all of their serviceimproving technological innovations might unnecessarily curtail ISPs’ incentive to innovate. 40 The Commission did, however, put the ISPs on notice that it would in
the future ‘‘rely on subsection 27(2) of the Act, where
appropriate, to prohibit a Canadian carrier from
restricting its broadband customers from dealing with an
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alternative service provider of the customer’s choice’’. 41
Neither the CRTC’s reconsideration of 2005-28 42 nor
the November 9th 2006 Order-in-Council which overruled much of it 43 took issue with these findings. While
these two rulings do not suggest that a comprehensive
network neutrality doctrine is developing at the CRTC,
one may emerge in the near future. Among its priorities
for the 2007-2008 year, the Commission lists ‘‘address
potential issues in respect of internet access traffic
shaping’’. 44

III. Justifiable Discrimination: Usage
and Congestion-Based

W

hat principles should guide the CRTC’s approach
to this issue? It goes almost without saying that
ISP discrimination against viruses or other content dangerous to users should continue. ‘‘Spam’’ is probably also
a legitimate target (although reaching a definition of
‘‘spam’’ acceptable to both senders and recipients might
be somewhat challenging). ISPs should also be allowed
to do anything that makes the network better, faster, or
cheaper for any user without having a negative impact
on anyone else. Apart from these elementary cases, what
other types of discrimination are ‘‘justifiable’’?
In economic terms, the Internet is a ‘‘club good’’,
potentially subject to congestion. 45 This means that it
can be shared, but at periods of high demand each additional user reduces the quality of service for all other
users. 46 Congestion can, however, be reduced if the
pricing system sends the right signals to consumers. The
CRTC should encourage the pricing of Internet access in
the most efficient and equitable fashion, and ISP price
discrimination that brings us closer to this goal is ‘‘justifiable’’ discrimination.

Ideal Internet Pricing (‘‘IIP’’)
The scholarly consensus regarding congestible
goods is that ‘‘competitive markets will reach an efficient
equilibrium if each user is charged a usage-sensitive price
set equal to their marginal contribution to congestion’’. 47
Thuy Nguyen and Grenville Armitage, applying this
insight to the Internet, describe the Holy Grail of
Internet pricing as an ‘‘ideal pricing scheme that is able
to provide different levels of services to different users
with different needs, charge users only for their perceived quality of service (‘QoS’) and consumer resources,
[and] support the non-uniformity of Internet traffic with
different QoS requirements’’. 48
tics:

An IIP regime would have the following characteris●

The price paid by each Internet user would
reflect the demands that he or she places upon
the network. Moving more bytes would cost
more, as would demanding a jitter-free, latencyfree connection. The price charged to the user
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would be proportional to the costs incurred by
ISPs to provide the service required.
●
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●

Quality of Service guarantees would be available
for a price in proportion to the cost of providing
them. Under such a system, VoIP users would
have access to the high-quality service they need.
However their doing so would not slow the network for or impose costs on others, because their
price would reflect their costs. 49
Peak-load pricing would apply. Use during highdemand times of day imposes external costs on
other users in the form of reduced speed. It also
costs ISPs in the long run, because they must
eventually create new capacity which will only
be used during high-demand hours. The price
paid to use the network should be proportional
to the total demand on the network at the time
of use. Such a system would reward users for
shifting use to off-peak hours, thereby increasing
the overall speed and efficiency of the Internet. 50

Such a regime would have advantages in terms of
both equity and efficiency. It is equitable for users of an
Internet application to pay the cost of meeting the
bandwidth, jitter, and latency requirements of their
application. The network is scarce, expanding it is expensive, and different users impose very different demands
upon it. According to one estimate, roughly 5% of
Internet users consume roughly 90% of the bandwidth. 51
To charge high-requirement users and low-requirement
users the same amount is to require the latter to subsidize the former. 52 The subsidy might take the form of
higher flat access charges (to fund the network expansions required by high-demand users), or it might take
the form of slower speeds. This subsidy might be appropriate if there was a public policy reason to encourage
high-requirement use more than low-requirement use,
but given that most high-requirement use is for personal
entertainment purposes, this is not the case.
IIP would also encourage the efficient use of a scarce
resource — bandwidth. Those who develop new applications should consider and seek to minimize demands on
the network. If users pay the actual costs of their use (as
opposed to a flat rate approximation), they will prefer
applications which minimize these costs. Users will also
shift their Internet usage to lower-demand periods.
These responses to price discrimination will encourage
the efficient use of the Internet and maximize social
welfare.
As is often the case with Internet policy, a road
transportation analogy casts light on this argument.
Many features of Ontario’s Highway 407 toll road
pricing regime could be usefully imitated by ISPs. The
price paid by a 407 user is based on: (i) the distance
travelled; (ii) the weight of the vehicle; and (iii) the time
of day at which the travel occurs. 53 Although this pricing
scheme may have been calculated to maximize the operator’s profit, it also has substantial efficiency benefits.
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Distance travelled and vehicle weight correspond to the
impact of the travel on the highway, and thereby to the
maintenance costs created by the use. The time of day
represents the number of other users who also want to
use the resource at that time. Charging more for use at
peak times creates an incentive to substitute use at other
times, and thereby promotes a more efficient usage pattern overall.
Of course, price discrimination is often unpopular
with users. Jeffrey Dale, head of the Ottawa Centre for
Research and Innovation, recently invoked the 407
analogy to make the opposite point.
Every now and then, to build a new road that bypasses
traffic, they put a toll road in. And that’s a two-tier system.
Do we really want that? I tell you, when I’m in Toronto and
I want to get across town, I’ll hop on the 407. But it bugs me
that I’m paying for a road. 54

We cannot have highways without paying for them;
they are enormously expensive, and they do not build or
maintain themselves. We can only decide whether to
pay for them with taxes or pay for them with tolls. Roads
built with taxes are mostly paid for by people who never
use them, or who place lighter-than-average burdens
upon them. Meanwhile, those who need the highway
most urgently at a given point in time (and who would
be willing to pay extra for it) cannot justifiably be given
priority. Paying for superhighways — of either the pavement or information variety — via across-the-board flat
charges is both inefficient and unjust. Sophisticated
pricing schemes like the 407 model and the IIP
described above are superior, and the CRTC should tolerate, if not encourage, their adoption among Canadian
Internet service providers. 55

Technical Feasibility of IIP
Even if the IIP described is ‘‘ideal’’, can ISPs afford to
implement it? Economists acknowledge that adopting a
more efficient pricing regime is only wise if the cost of
implementing and administering the system does not
outweigh the efficiency gains. 56 Two technical challenges
of IIP must be acknowledged.
Distribution of Costs
A high-requirement user does not only impose costs
on his or her own ISP. These costs are spread across
various network administrators. A user’s data is split into
countless packets, each of which may take a different
route to the destination. Costs are incurred by the
owners of each wire over which a part of the data travels.
This makes it challenging to, for example, provide true
quality of service guarantees to users. As one expert
recently explained,
In order to make it work properly, service providers around
the world have to agree on giving each other’s top traffic the
same edge when it flows across multiple networks. . . . we
would need agreement from all Internet service providers
that when packets are tagged as high priority that we would
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all treat it [that way] when it comes on our networks and
pass it through without delay or minimal delay. 57
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However, this challenge is not as severe as it initially
appears. Currently, under ‘‘peering’’ pricing arrangements, ISPs of approximately the same size agree to carry
each others’ traffic free of charge. ISPs of different sizes
enter ‘‘transit arrangements’’ whereby smaller ISP ‘‘X’’
pays a larger ISP ‘‘Y’’ a flat fee to compensate Y for
carrying more of X’s traffic than X does of Y’s traffic. 58
There is no apparent reason why peering arrangements
could not accommodate the IIP regime described above,
especially if ISPs are able to reach a consensus protocol
for providing and pricing Quality of Service. If they are
unable to do so, then transit arrangements might need to
become somewhat more complex, so as to allow each
provider to collect from others the congestion price of
traffic which they originate.
Cost of Metering
Ideally, the price of Internet use would be precisely
calibrated to the congestion that it causes to others.
However, implementing such a system would be challenging and costly. North American regulators confronted a similar challenge when designing pricing
regimes for telephone service. 59 The F.C.C. concluded at
the time that, although metered pricing for telephone
calls would be more efficient, the cost of monitoring and
billing use in this way would outweigh the advantage.
Professor Yoo argues that, due to the nature of packetswitching technology, ‘‘transaction costs associated with
metering Internet traffic are likely to be even more significant than those associated with local telephone service’’. 60 Yoo defends contractual prohibitions on
bandwidth-intensive network uses as a second-best alternative, given the technical difficulty of metering. 61
Arguably, Yoo gives up on the potential benefits of
IIP too quickly. While the technical barriers cannot be
ignored, substantial progress has been made toward
overcoming them. In Canada, high-speed Internet access
is already sold in tiers, with users paying more for faster
speeds and higher maximum data transfer. This is a substantial improvement over totally flat pricing, and there
is reason to believe that ISPs might be contemplating
further moves toward IIP. 62 Professors Nguyen and
Armitage recently surveyed various Internet pricing
models, 63 most of which are designed to provide some if
not all of the characteristics of IIP. For example, under
the ‘‘smart market’’ system, each packet would have a
header indicating how much the sending party would
be willing to pay to ensure the prioritized delivery of the
packet, 64 and congested servers would conduct auctions
between packets in the queue.
The Impossibility of Perfection
Nonetheless, perfect IIP is not yet technically feasible, because network administration tools are not yet
sufficiently sophisticated. Moreover, a Canadian ISP
might not be able to unilaterally implement IIP in the

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

absence of a new pricing protocol among all ISPs, even if
they had all the right tools and the intention to apply
‘‘ideal’’ pricing. Therefore, whatever network administration policies an ISP adopts, User A may nonetheless pay
more or experience slower speeds than User B despite
the fact that A’s impositions on the network are equal to
or lesser than B’s. Reasonable deviations from ideal
pricing should not be considered violations of subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act, so long as
they were not intentionally caused by the ISP.
What if an ISP did not intentionally cause a
problem, but was negligent or willfully blind in its creation? Professor Felten asks us to consider a hypothetical
ISP which is aware that a ‘‘jitter’’ phenomenon occurs on
its wires that slows down certain high-demand applications. Suppose that ISP
didn’t take any obvious steps to cause the problem but is
happy that it exists, and is subtly managing its network in a
way that fosters jitter. Network management is complicated,
and many management decisions could impact jitter one
way or the other. A network provider who wants to cause
high jitter can do so, and might have pretextual excuses for
all of the steps it takes. Can regulators distinguish this kind
of stratagem from the case of fair and justified engineering
decisions that happen to cause a little temporary jitter? 65

This mandate may be challenging for the CRTC.
However, the Commission may be assisted by the large
number of technically sophisticated users who will be
ready and willing to complain about unjust discrimination on the part of ISPs. A policy reform which gives
users the right to not be discriminated against except on
the basis of ideal pricing will encourage them to vigilantly monitor network speeds and prices, and report
infractions to the CRTC.

Charging Content Providers
Many ISPs would welcome the opportunity to
charge providers of high-requirement content, in addition to consumers thereof. As noted previously, Videotron CEO Robert Despatie has called for a tariff on
content providers, the revenues from which would presumably go to ISPs to offset network-expansion
charges. 66 Presumably, Google has jumped aboard the
net neutrality bandwagon due to an apprehension that,
absent regulation, they might eventually be required to
compensate ISPs for the demands placed on the Internet
by Google’s content.
A high-requirement content provider would obviously prefer a flat-rate Internet pricing regime, which
would allow it to continue receiving subsidies from lowrequirement users. However, if IIP were to be implemented, the content provider might be indifferent as to
whether it is the user or the provider who pays. If the
users pay, they will respond by consuming less highrequirement content. It is not clear whether the highrequirement provider would prefer this outcome to the
alternative of paying an IIP price itself.
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Given their ownership of the wires and the lack of
any convincing argument to the contrary, ISPs should in
principle be allowed to charge congestion prices to
either the provider or the consumer, so long as the total
amount charged is closely tied to the actual congestion
impact of the usage. As Georgetown Law Professor
Gregory Sidak observes,
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There is no basis in economic theory to presume that it
would be socially optimal for end users to pay for all of the
cost of building a high-speed broadband network while the
companies that deliver content or applications to those
same end users over that network — and therefore derive
substantial economic advantage from its use — pay
nothing. 67

In Canada, however, there are two practical impediments to imposing congestion pricing on content providers as opposed to users. Firstly, the parent companies of
Canadian ISPs also own Internet content providers. I will
argue below that ISPs should not discriminate (other
than pursuant to IIP regimes or reasonable approximations thereof) against content provided by their corporate parents, and enforcing such a principle is technically
difficult enough. Requiring ISPs to administer neutral IIP
pricing to such affiliated content would be even more
challenging.
The second impediment is jurisdictional. If Canadian ISPs were to send CRTC-authorized bills to foreign
content providers for the congestion impact of their content, those bills would not be paid. Congestion pricing
for content providers could only be introduced through
an international treaty binding, at the very least, the
United States. In the interim, the equity and efficiency
value of congestion pricing can be obtained in a system
which charges only users.

Unjustifiable Discrimination
To the extent that it is reasonably technically feasible, every user and content provider should have the
right to the same speed and the same price as every other
user or content provider who places the same technical
demands on the network when the congestion level is
equal. In other words, forms of discrimination other than
IIP or approximations thereof are unjustifiable. Specifically, the CRTC should interpret subsection 27(2) of the
Telecommunications Act to forbid the following four
types of discrimination.
1. Discrimination based on the ISP’s legal or
moral opinions
In blockading www.voices-for-change.ca, Telus cited
privacy and security concerns. Such issues should be left
to courts and statutory tribunals, which have the expertise and the legitimate authority to address them. There
is no justification for vigilante behaviour by an ISP. This
principle was recognized by recent Criminal Code
amendments designed to curtail child pornography,
which require ISPs to remove material only upon receipt
of a court order. 68 It is likewise inappropriate for ISPs to
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censor material based on moral or aesthetic judgments,
as did HostOnFibre in withdrawing web-hosting service
from slad.net. 69
The Internet began as a non-commercial public
commons, and to a large extent retains this character.
Free speech online should not be curtailed by profitoriented private actors. If and when censorship must
occur, it must be public authorities authorized by the
due process of law which perform this function. The
CRTC should treat any discrimination based on an ISP’s
legal or moral judgment as a violation of subsection 27(2).
2. Discrimination in favour of owned or affiliated
content
ISPs currently have a financial incentive to discriminate in favour of content provided by entities which they
own or with which they are affiliated. 70 Rogers and Bell,
for example, are owned by corporations which also own
content-providers, and might well be tempted to bias
their networks in favour of this content. Even a small
and independent ISP could be offered money by Content Provider X to prioritize X’s data over that of Content
Provider Y. It might make business sense to enter such
an arrangement, even if the ISP would lose some customers in doing so. Shaw’s $10 VoIP QoS Enhancement,
according to Vonage Canada, constituted discrimination
in favour of Shaw’s own VoIP service. 71 In a recent
article, Barbara Van Schewick used a comprehensive economic analysis to show that even an ISP with very little
market power might profit by discriminating in favour
of owned or affiliated content. 72
Subsection 27(2) should be interpreted to forbid
this type of discrimination. For example, suppose ISP X is
affiliated with online Game A. Unaffiliated Game B has
the same network requirements (bandwidth, latency,
jitter, etc.) as Game A. Every Canadian customer of ISP X
who uses Game B should have the right to the same
speed of access and same level of network charges as a
ISP X customer who uses Game A, within the limits of
technical feasibility.
Strong economic arguments support this principle.
In their F.C.C. submission, Professors Wu and Lessig
emphasize the importance of investment in the development of future applications. 73 The Internet is a platform
for competition among these applications, and the competition will be most fruitful for consumers if the platform is level. Professor Van Schewick identifies two ways
in which discrimination in favour of owned or affiliated
content impedes application innovation by acting as disincentives to investment. Firstly, it allows ISPs to capture
some of the profit which would otherwise accrue to the
application innovator, thereby reducing the innovator’s
incentive. Secondly, it introduces uncertainty among
potential innovators, who will come to perceive the
Internet as an unreliable and constantly shifting source
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of unknown costs. They will respond to the uncertainty
by investing less in Internet applications. 74
Moreover, the Internet is not just a marketplace; it is
a platform for free expression and cultural exchange.
Canadians should be able to use the Internet to communicate and create without being unduly exploited by ISP
profiteering. As a matter of principle, it should be just as
easy for a user to access information published by a nonprofit organization as it is to access the largest multinational’s Web site (assuming that the two Web sites place
the same technical demands on the network). This will
not be true for long if content providers are permitted to
pay ISPs for express-lane access to users.
3. Discrimination based on demand inelasticity or
market dominance
Even in the absence of legal/aesthetic judgments or
a bias for owned/affiliated content, some ISPs may be
tempted to target certain applications while leaving
others with equal requirements untouched. One anonymous visitor to Michael Geist’s Web site claimed that, in
discriminating against certain network uses, ‘‘cable companies targe[t] services that are painful to the consumer if
they [are] degraded. Typical users do not care if they have
to restart a BitTorrent session to download music —
they do care if their long distance telephone service is
poor’’. 75 While this allegation is unsubstantiated, it is
plausible that ISPs might charge higher rates or offer
poorer service to certain users simply because they do
not believe that those users will respond by switching to
a different ISP. Given the limited competition between
broadband ISPs in Canada, it seems unlikely that the
market alone can discipline this type of ‘‘unjustifiable’’
discrimination. The four largest Canadian ISPs (Bell,
Rogers, Shaw, and Telus) together received 63% of retail
Internet access revenues in 2005, an increase from 44%
in 2001. 76
4. Absolute blockades of legal and safe content
Apart from material which is spam, dangerous, or
illegal, absolute blockades of content should be forbidden. Even ‘‘justifiable’’ IIP-oriented discrimination
should not take the form of a total blockade. Every legal
and non-destructive use should be available at some
price and at some speed. Subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act should be interpreted so as to
forbid all absolute blockades.

The Justification for Regulation
This paper’s ‘‘bright line’’ test proposes to permit
price discrimination based on network demands, while
forbidding many other forms of discrimination. This
would seem to accommodate the most common ISP
argument against network neutrality regulation — that
someone needs to pay for the Internet, and that those
who place the heaviest burdens on it should pay their
fair share. 77 However, an ISP might plausibly claim the
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right to engage in the forms of discrimination which
were defined above as ‘‘unjustifiable’’. The wires and
servers which form the Internet are private property. ISPs
have a prima facie right to do whatever they want with
property they paid for, built, and own. Accepting a payment from Yahoo to prioritize its data stream to users is
not, they might argue, a particularly heinous abuse. Grocery stores give priority shelf space to cereal brands
which pay shelving fees, and can choose to exclude some
brands completely. Why shouldn’t an ISP be allowed to
do the same with content? A similar argument might be
made by Mr. Snood, CEO of the Alberta ISP which
evicted the vampirism Web site slad.net from its server. If
it was legal for him to start a magazine and refuse to
print submissions from vampirists on aesthetic grounds,
why should it be illegal for him to found an ISP and
refuse hosting to them for the same reasons?
Public interest arguments can also be adduced in
support of this position. This essay’s proposal would curtail the ability of ISPs to profit from network investments
by making side-payments from content providers and
subsidization of corporate siblings via data discrimination illegal. This will tend to reduce the rate of investment in these networks by reducing the anticipated
profit. 78 We must also bear in mind the precedent we set
by curtailing profits in this way. Entrepreneurs
throughout the economy could be deterred from innovating for fear that their profits too might eventually be
confiscated by regulators.
In response, it should first be noted that the impact
of the proposed regulations on profit may be negligible,
given that there is no clear case of a Canadian ISP having
profited from ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination. Moreover,
the anti-regulation arguments lose much of their force
when the highly regulated context of the industry is
considered. Broadband networks have been profitable in
part courtesy of subsidies from the public delivered by
the CRTC. 79 The recent case of Federation of Canadian
Municipalities v. AT & T Canada Corp. provides an
interesting example. 80 Ledcor Inc. was unable to convince Vancouver to permit it to lay cable on municipal
property. The CRTC obligingly compelled the city to do
so in exchange for a nominal payment, relying on sections 44 and 64(2) of the Telecommunications Act. This
decision constituted a subsidization of Ledcor at the
expense of Vancouver municipal ratepayers, who would
have benefited had their municipality been able to name
its price for the access sought by Ledcor. 81 In a regulated
industry like telecommunications, corporations receive
subsidies from the public but must also anticipate special
constraints on their profitability such as the neutrality
regulations proposed by this paper.
Nonetheless, we must still weigh the benefits of
new regulation against its innovation-deadening costs.
For two reasons, cost-benefit analysis supports regulation
in the case of network neutrality, but not in the case of
the supermarket shelves cereal-stocking situation men-
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tioned previously. Firstly, the Internet is a platform not
only for commerce, but also for democracy and culture.
Excessive ISP discrimination, therefore, risks skewing not
just cereal purchases, but also our intellectual firmament
and our creative process.
More importantly, permitting discrimination always
undermines innovation, even in the grocery store.
Someone who invents a fantastic new cereal may not be
able to get it into the consumer’s line of vision without
coming up with the shelving fee demanded by the grocery store. This barrier to entry is deleterious for consumers, because they are less likely to be exposed to an
outstanding product which they would prefer over the
market incumbent. However, the benefit to the consumer of regulating cereal-shelf neutrality is negligible,
given how little they have to gain from switching cereals.
The benefit of regulation (more cereal choice for consumers) is outweighed by the cost (infringement of grocery stores’ private property rights and negative impact
on future grocery store investment). The opposite is true
of the proposed network neutrality regulation. The
advantages of allowing users to choose between applications competing on a level playing field are enormous.
The profound economic benefits which the Internet has
produced to date would arguably have been impossible
in the absence of net neutrality.
These arguments help explain the economic rationale for network neutrality regulation. They do not,
however, provide us with a response for Mr. Snood, who
might claim the same right to exclude aesthetically
objectionable content from his servers as he would have
to exclude it from a magazine. The CRTC’s moral
authority to prevent ISPs from discriminating on the
basis of legal and ethical judgments comes from the
doctrine of the ‘‘common carrier’’. Common carriers are
exempted from liability for libellous or otherwise illegal
content they carry, but in return, they are forbidden to
interfere with that content. Section 36 of the Telecommunications Act provides that ‘‘except where the Commission approves otherwise, a Canadian carrier shall not
control the content or influence the meaning or purpose
of telecommunications carried by it for the public’’. 82
Telus and Hostonfibre.com may have violated this section by discriminating against Voices for Change and
slad.net, respectively.

IV. Proposed Legal Reforms
Is the Existing Statute Sufficient?

A

bove, this essay discussed the CRTC’s efforts to
address the network neutrality issue using subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act. No contravention was found in the Cybersurf and VoIP decisions,
but the CRTC did put ISPs on notice that the ‘‘issue can
. . . be addressed by the Commission on a case-by-case
basis, should it arise’’. 83 One might argue that that no
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further action need be taken on the net neutrality file in
Canada. Refraining from further neutrality regulation at
this point in time would have the virtue of allowing
maximum discretion to the regulator in the face of rapid
technological change.
However, subsection 27(2) is highly ambiguous.
Among the enormous variety of possible traffic shaping
and bandwidth management policies, it is far from clear
today which the Commission considers ‘‘unjust’’ discrimination, ‘‘undue’’ preference, or ‘‘unreasonable’’ preference. 84 Allowing this ambiguity to persist has two
important deleterious consequences.
The first is business uncertainty. Canadian carriers
and content providers will be able to plan more efficiently if they are given some certainty about what forms
of discrimination will be allowed. In the absence of it,
they may make inefficient investment decisions. If ‘‘justifiable’’ discrimination is to be permitted (as I argue it
should), then application developers should be made
aware of this as soon and as unequivocally as possible.
This will encourage them to give due weight to the
necessity of economizing on bandwidth as they develop
new applications.
Secondly, the rule of law is better served by greater
clarity. Although some discretion must be retained by
the decision-maker in every administrative process, when
it is possible to enunciate broad principles, we should do
so. The ‘‘bright line’’ test stated above is just such a broad
principle. The Telecommunications Policy Review
echoes this point with its argument that ‘‘Canada’s telecommunications legislation should provide a clearer
direction on when regulation is required as well as on
the nature and extent of regulatory measures’’. 85

Three Necessary Changes
Only three modest legal reforms would be necessary to give effect to this essay’s proposal. Firstly, the
Telecommunications Act was written for the telephone
age, not the Internet age. The two sections of the Act
relevant to the net neutrality issue, sections 27(2) and 36,
apply only to ‘‘Canadian carriers’’, a term defined in the
Act to include only those who use, own, or operate a
‘‘transmission facility’’ in order to ‘‘provide telecommunications services to the public for compensation’’. 86 This
excludes a number of companies which might be in a
position to engage in Internet discrimination, such as
Vonage and Primus. The Telecommunications Act
should be amended so as to add ‘‘Internet Service Provider’’ to the definitions. ISPs should be defined so as to
include anyone in a position to control the flow of data
on the Internet. The phrase ‘‘or internet service provider’’
should then be added to sections 27(2) and 36, after the
words ‘‘Canadian carrier’’.
Secondly, The CRTC should issue an order indicating that it will interpret subsection 27(2) so as to
prohibit ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination as defined above,
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but specifically authorizing ISPs to engage in ‘‘justifiable’’
discrimination.
Thirdly, the CRTC or another federal agency needs
to launch a consumer education campaign. One advantage of flat-rate Internet pricing regimes is their simplicity. Any movement toward the complex ideal
described above increases the likelihood of consumer
confusion. For example, Rogers Communications Inc.
currently sells four tiers of high-speed Internet access to
users in Toronto. It costs $12 per month to upgrade from
‘‘lite’’ to ‘‘express’’ service. According to Rogers’s ‘‘Product
Comparison’’ page, the only service enhancement which
a user receives in return for this upgrade is four additional e-mail accounts. 87 Presumably the service is faster,
but how much faster? How much time will the average
user save on a given task or application?
Rogers’s speed tiers represent a very minor deviation
from flat-rate pricing. However, even this small step is so
poorly explained by the ISP that Canadian consumers
are completely unable to make informed decisions
about upgrading. How much more difficult will it be for
consumers to understand a complex ideal Internet
pricing scheme of the type described above? The CRTC
must ensure that ISPs’ price discrimination regimes are
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as transparent and comprehensible as possible to consumers.
An excellent model for this consumer-education
mission is the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada’s
‘‘Credit Cards and You’’ Web site. 88 Like Internet access,
credit cards are priced in a very complex fashion which
can easily confuse consumers. The FCAC has responded
with an excellent Web site which compares credit cards
available in Canada. 89 The CRTC or the Ministry of
Industry should launch a similar initiative for Internet
access.
The intellectual ferment stimulated by the TPR
makes this a good time for federal authorities to develop
an intelligent network neutrality policy. The issue has
not yet been consumed in hyperbole as it has south of
the border, and this may facilitate a thoughtful approach.
This paper has suggested that efficient price discrimination should be tolerated and encouraged, while most
other forms of discrimination should be curtailed. This
model, the application of which would require only a
few minor reforms, could be an important building
block for an efficient and equitable Canadian telecommunications policy.
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